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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-1012.5. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondents accept, for purposes of this review, Petitioner's statement of the issues.1 
However, as discussed in the body of this brief, Petitioner has failed to properly preserve Issues 
Four, Five and Six. 
On Issue Number Four, Officer Lucas failed to make the requisite legal argument or an 
offer of proof at the hearing to preserve this issue for appeal upon denial of his attempt to 
introduce, for impeachment purposes, the tape recording of the polygraph examination of Martin 
Spegar. Additionally, the Murray Civil Service Commission (the "Commission") believed that 
Officer Lucas could and would avail himself of the alternative means of introducing that tape 
recording. He failed to do so. These failures before the tribunal amount to a waiver of Issue 
Number Four upon appeal. 
Regarding Issue Number Five, Officer Lucas failed to object at the hearing to the 
Commission's retention and use of independent legal counsel for the hearing. Failure to enter that 
objection waived the Issue Number Five upon appeal. 
Regarding Issue Number Six, Officer Lucas failed to plead and/or argue before the 
Commission his allegation that Murray City failed to follow its own policies and procedures in the 
internal affairs investigation. Failure to plead and argue this assertion waived Issue Number Six 
1
 Petitioner has failed to cite to the record to demonstrate that any of the issues identified by him were preserved before 
the Commission as required by Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah Rules App. P., made applicable to this appeal by Rule 18, Utah R. 
App. P. 
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upon appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for all issues before this Court is whether the Commission abused 
its discretion or exceeded its authority. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991); Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm% 908 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah App. 1995). See, 
Respondents' Point Number One for additional discussion of this issue. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative of the issues before this Court: 
(1) Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1977, as amended 1991). 
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent accepts Petitioner's statement of the case as sufficient for purposes of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts set forth by Petitioner are actually immaterial and should be 
disregarded by this Court for purposes of this appeal: the second and third sentences of Number 
1 and Numbers 3,4, 5, 9, and 10. 
In addition to the facts set forth by Petitioner, the following facts are significant and 
should be considered by this Court: 
1. Officer Lucas made internally inconsistent statements and statements inconsistent with 
other witnesses both during the internal affairs investigation and at the pre-termination hearing. 
2. Officer Lucas was terminated for (1) untruthful statements made during the course of 
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the internal affairs investigation, and (2) untruthful statements made during his pre-termination 
hearing. (R. 1). Officer Lucas was not terminated based upon his actions during the arrest and 
processing of Martin Spegar or based upon any conclusions arising from the internal affairs 
investigation of those circumstances. 
3. On August 7,1996, Officer Lucas was afforded a pre-termination hearing on grounds 
which included untruthfulness in the internal affairs investigation. (R. 365-382). 
4. The Notice of Pre-termination Hearing was received by Officer Lucas in time for him 
to review the allegations. (R. 365) 
5. The Notice of Pre-termination Hearing identified, among other bases for the hearing, 
the allegation of untruthfulness: 
You violated the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics which calls for 
honesty and integrity in all official acts. The acts of untruthfulness 
occurred in denying events which occurred concerning a service 
weapon after receiving the cautionary warning under Garrity. 
(R. 364). 
6. The Commission held a hearing on October 14,1996 to hear arguments and receive 
evidence on the City's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of a retaliatory motive in the 
termination of Officer Lucas. (R. 232-282). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Scope Of Review By The Civil Service Commission And The Scope Of 
Judicial Review In This Matter Is Much Narrower Than Urged By Petitioner 
Officer Lucas was discharged on very narrow grounds: untruthfulness during an internal 
affairs investigation and in a pre-termination hearing. The authority of and scope of the hearing 
before the Civil Service Commission is strictly limited to only two issues: (1) whether the facts 
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support Chief Killian's conclusion that Officer Lucas was untruthful, and if so, (2) whether the 
untruthfulness warranted discharge. The judicial review by this Court of the Commission's 
decision is statutorily limited to a review of the record to determine whether the Commission 
exceeded its authority or abused its discretion, and in making this determination, this Court should 
afford the Commission considerable deference in matters within its discretion, i.e., those within 
the Commission's authority. Nevertheless, Officer Lucas improperly attempted to treat the 
hearing before the Civil Service Commission as a trial before a court of law with much broader 
authority and jurisdiction than the Commission actually has. Additionally, Officer Lucas 
improperly expects this Court to expand its review of the Commission's decision to include a de 
novo review of the facts. 
2. The Commission Properly Excluded Evidence As To A Defense Of 
Retaliatory Discharge In Its Evaluation Of Officer Lucas9 Termination 
The authority of the Commission is very narrow as clearly defined by statute. The 
Commission acted properly and within its jurisdiction when it disallowed any evidence of the 
defense of retaliatory discharge. The Commission is not bound to conduct its proceedings 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence, and even if it was, it properly excluded the defense of 
retaliatory discharge because the evidence was irrelevant. Alternatively, even if the Commission 
should have admitted the evidence of retaliatory discharge, Officer Lucas cannot show harmful 
error. 
3. Sufficient Material Evidence Exists In The Record To Support The 
Commission's Decision To Uphold Chief Killian's Conclusion That Lucas 
Had Been Untruthful 
There is sufficient evidence in the record before the Commission for a reasonable person 
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to conclude that Officer Lucas had been untruthful Officer Lucas' statements during the internal 
affairs investigation and at the pre-termination hearing were both internally inconsistent and 
inconsistent with other witnesses accounts. 
4. The Commission Properly Concluded That The Termination Of A Police 
Officer Was An Appropriate Disciplinary Action For Untruthfulness 
Because police officers are held to a higher standard of conduct and because the police 
chief and the public at large must be able to depend on the fundamental trustworthiness of police 
officers, the Chiefs termination of Officer Lucas for being untruthful is completely justified. 
5. The Commission Properly Excluded Mr. Spegar's Taped Polygraph 
Examination And Even If The Evidence Should Have Been Admitted, 
Failure To Do So Was Harmless Error 
The Commission is not bound to follow the Rules of Evidence. Even if it were, the 
Commission properly excluded the audio tape of Mr. Spegar's polygraph examination because 
Officer Lucas failed to properly lay foundation for the admission of the evidence. Furthermore, 
any error by the Commission in the exclusion of the evidence is harmless because the transcript of 
the audio tape was entered into the record. 
6. The Commission Appropriately Retained And Utilized The Services Of 
Independent Legal Counsel And Even If The Extent Of Counsel's 
Involvement Were Inappropriate, There Is No Basis For Reversal Since The 
Error Is Harmless 
The Commission has the right to hire legal counsel to advise it on legal issues which are 
outside the knowledge and expertise of laypersons sitting on the Commission. Even if the 
Commission should not have utilized legal counsel in the proceedings, Officer Lucas failed to 
properly object. Additionally, even if counsel for the Commission should not have been so 
involved in the hearing, any error is harmless because any involvement by legal counsel for the 
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Commission did not affect the outcome of the hearing. 
7. The City's Failure To Comply With Its Rules Was Immaterial To The Basis 
Of Officer Lucas' Termination And To The Commission's Affirmation Of 
That Termination 
Officer Lucas was not terminated as a result of specific findings made in an internal affairs 
investigation. Instead, he was terminated for making untruthful statements to his superiors during 
the internal affairs investigation and during his pre-termination hearing. Because Officer Lucas 
was not terminated as a result of the internal affairs investigation, the City's failure to follow any 
of its policies or procedural rules for internal affairs investigations is irrelevant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THIS MATTER IS MUCH 
NARROWER THAN URGED BY PETITIONER 
The Petitioner implies throughout his brief that both the Commission's authority and this 
Court's standard of review are much broader than they actually are. The Commission, however, 
had a very narrow role to perform in the review of Officer Lucas' termination and this Court has a 
very narrow standard of review in the appeal of the Commission's decision. 
The evaluation by the Commission was limited to two issues: (1) do the facts support the 
Chief Killian's conclusion that Officer Lucas was being untruthful, and if so, (2) does the 
untruthfulness warrant discharge? Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm Vz, 
908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah App. 1995) {citing In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 
(Utah 1986)). Any evidence not directly related to these two inquiries is immaterial to the issue 
that was before the Commission. 
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Furthermore, the standard of review by this Court is limited to a determination of whether 
the Commission (1) abused its discretion or (2) exceeded its authority. Salt Lake City Corp. at 
874; Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991). 
In addressing the issues asserted by Officer Lucas in this appeal, it is essential to keep 
several fundamental facts in mind. First, Officer Lucas was not terminated for his behavior during 
and related to the arrest and processing of Martin Spegar. Officer Lucas was terminated for 
dishonesty. Specifically, the Chief of Police terminated Officer Lucas for making untruthful 
statements in the course of an internal affairs investigation and subsequently during a pre-
termination hearing. (R. 1) The issue before the Commission was whether there was factual basis 
for the allegation that Officer Lucas gave untruthful statements, not whether the internal affairs 
investigation against Officer Lucas for his other conduct was or was not appropriately conducted. 
A. The Role Of The Commission Is Narrowly Limited To Either Affirming Or Denying 
The Termination Of Officer Lucas 
Murray City Police Department initiated an internal affairs investigation in order to review 
Officer Lucas' conduct during a post-arrest search of Martin Spegar. Specifically, allegations 
were made by members of the public indicating that Officer Lucas had improperly pulled his 
weapon on Martin Spegar during the search that took place in an interrogation room at the 
Murray City Police Department. During the internal affairs investigation, Officer Lucas first made 
an unequivocal denial that he had pulled his weapon. (R. 306). Then, after finding out that 
another officer witnessed him with his weapon pulled, Officer Lucas changed his story and stated 
that he didn't know whether he pulled his weapon or not. (R. 398). From that point on, Officer 
Lucas continued to make inconsistent statements about whether or not his weapon was actually 
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pulled (R. 366, 367, 375). The results of the internal affairs investigation proved to be 
inconclusive, and Officer Lucas was not disciplined as a result of any action that was taken by him 
during the search of Martin Spegar. However, Officer Lucas was terminated for making 
untruthful statements to his superior officers during the internal affairs investigation and during his 
pre-termination hearing. (R. 1). Officer Lucas appealed Chief Killian's decision to terminate him 
to the Commission. 
At the Commission's hearing, Officer Lucas continued to make inconsistent statements 
regarding the events surrounding his search of Martin Spegar. Officer Lucas also attempted cloud 
the focus of the Commission hearing and enter evidence on issues outside the scope of the 
Commission's authority. Specifically, Officer Lucas wanted to introduce evidence of an alleged 
retaliatory discharge which the Commission properly liminied out. (R. 162-163). See also 
Respondent's argument on Point 2. Officer Lucas also argued at the hearing that he only had his 
weapon at his side instead of pointed at Martin Spegar's head and that he did not intend to 
deceive his superior officers with his statements. (R. 835-852). The problem with the majority of 
Officer Lucas' evidence and argument at the Commission hearing is that those issues were 
irrelevant to the Commission's determination. Any inquiry into whether or not Officer Lucas 
actually pulled his weapon on Martin Spegar was immaterial to the Commission's determinations 
because Officer Lucas' statements were internally inconsistent. Respondent points all of this out 
because Petitioner has argued and continues to argue facts which were irrelevant to the 
Commission's hearing and facts which are outside this Court's purview. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1977, as amended 1991) provides that a civil service 
commission "fully hear and determine" issues related to a termination action taken by a 
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department head. As applied to the termination of a police officer, the Commission is restricted 
to "a simple thumbs up or thumbs down on the Chiefs suspension and termination decisions." 
Salt Lake City Corp. at 876. The Commission's inquiry is limited to determination of two issues: 
"(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2) do the charges 
warrant the sanction imposed?" Id. citing In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Utah 
1986). 
The inquiry of the Commission was limited to a determination of (1) whether Officer 
Lucas had been untruthful during the course of the internal affairs investigation and at the pre-
termination hearing and if so, (2) whether the termination of Officer Lucas was warranted under 
the circumstances. Because the Commission answered "yes" to both of these questions, it 
properly affirmed the termination of Officer Lucas. (R. 217-223,224-25). 
B. This Court's Standard Of Review On All Of Petitioner's Points Of Error Is An 
Abuse Of Discretion Standard 
Petitioner improperly argues that the standard of review on his Issues Numbers 1, 4, 5, 
and 6 is a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the Commission's decision. 
Petitioner's Brief, p. 2. The scope of review for all the issues raised in Petitioner's brief is an 
abuse of discretion standard as set forth in the Civil Service Commission provisions of the Utah 
Code, which provide in part: 
The review by Court of Appeals shall be on the record of the 
commission and shall be for the purpose of determining if the 
commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1991). 
This Court has discussed the "abuse of discretion" standard in the termination of a public 
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employee setting in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991).2 
The Tolman court noted that there are judicial and statutory limits to discretion and defined 
discretion as "an arena bounded by the law, within which the tribunal may exercise its judgment as 
it sees fit." Tolman, at 26 (emphasis added). The court goes on to state that an abuse of 
discretion is "a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment-one that is clearly against the logic 
and the effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application or against the reasonable 
and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing." Tolman, at 26 
{citing State v. Draper, 27 P.2d 39, 49-50 (Utah 1933)). 
If a decision by the Commission falls within its discretion, such as its findings of fact, the 
appellate court reviews that determination under a "clearly erroneous standard, giving great 
deference to the tribunal's findings." Tolman, at 27 (emphasis added). Only if the tribunal has 
stepped outside its "arena of discretion," i.e., outside its authority, does the appellate court apply 
a correction of error standard. Id. "In essence, a reviewing court never overturns a lower 
tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion." Id. (emphasis added). 
Clearly, as undisputed by Petitioner, Petitioner's issues 2 and 3 fall within the 
Commission's discretion and are judged upon an abuse of discretion standard. 
Similarly, all of the evidentiary rulings of the Commission and the decision by the Commission to 
hire outside counsel fall squarely within the realm of its discretion. The standard of review for all 
issues before this Court is an abuse of discretion standard with a great deal of deference allowed 
to the Commission's decisions. 
Tolman was before the Court of Appeals in a somewhat unusual posture, being an appeal from a district court's 
review under Rule 65B, Utah R. Civ. P., of an administrative proceeding. The standard of review, however, is the same. 
Tolman at 26. 
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The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) does not apply to this action. Davis 
County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah App. 1988) (act applies only to state and not 
to local agencies); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(b) ("agency" as covered by the act "does not 
mean... any political subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision 
of the state.") As a result, any case law discussing standard of review of an agency covered by 
the UAPA is not controlling in this matter. This Court must look only to statutory provisions 
governing judicial review of a civil service commission review and case law related to review of 
local government administrative decisions to determine the proper standard of review.3 
Respondent argues this point because the task for this Court is much narrower than 
implied by the issues presented by Officer Lucas. The Commission's inquiry was, consistent with 
statute and case law, narrowly tailored to determining whether the facts supported Chief Killian's 
conclusion that Officer Lucas had been untruthful and whether that untruthfulness justified his 
termination. This Court's review of the Commissions conclusions is limited by statute to a 
determination from the record before the Commission whether the Commission abused its 
discretion or exceeded its authority. Because the essential determinations by the Commission 
clearly fall within its discretion, this Court must afford those determinations considerable 
deference. Given the narrow scope of review by this Court, many of the arguments presented by 
Officer Lucas fall outside the parameters of appropriate judicial review under § 10-3-1012.5 and 
are immaterial to the issue of whether the Commission abused its discretion. 
3
 This point is made because many of the cases within the area of administrative law, including several cited by Officer 
Lucas, explicitly or implicitly rely on UAPA provisions which are inconsistent with the common law related to administra-
tive reviews, making them inapplicable to a review of the actions of the Commission. 
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POINT II 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE AS TO A 
DEFENSE OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE IN ITS EVALUATION OF 
OFFICER LUCAS' TERMINATION 
A. The Jurisdiction Of The Commission Is Very Narrow And Does Not Include The 
Authority To Evaluate Legal Defenses 
The scope of the Civil Service Commission's authority is clearly and narrowly defined by 
statute and case law to a determination of (1) whether facts exist to support the charges of 
untruthfulness against Officer Lucas by the Chief of Police, Ken Killian, and if so, (2) whether the 
termination of Officer Lucas was appropriate under the circumstances. Salt Lake City Corp., at 
876 citing In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Utah 1986). If the Commission's 
answer to either of these questions was no, the Commission was bound to reverse the termination 
of Officer Lucas. See, Salt Lake City Corp., at 877. 
Officer Lucas argues, in effect, that the Commission should function on the same level as a 
court of law and widen the scope of its inquiry beyond its statutory authority 
to include a hearing of the legal defense of retaliatory discharge. However, the Commission is 
not a tribunal of general jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is narrowly limited by statute and applicable 
case law. It is permitted only to determine the sufficiency of the cause of removal, not any legal 
defenses to the cause of removal. Salt Lake City Corp. at 876, citing Vetterli at 797. If the 
Commission had widened the scope of inquiry in such a fashion, it would have been a clear abuse 
of discretion and reversible error. 
12 
B. The Commission Is Not Bound To Conduct Its Proceedings Pursuant To The Utah 
Rules Of Evidence 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the significant differences between judicial and 
administrative procedures and acknowledged that strict application of judicial procedures by an 
administrative agency is inappropriate. 
Administrative proceedings are usually conducted with greater 
flexibility and informality than judicial proceedings. Rigid 
adherence to judicial procedures in administrative proceedings is 
generally inappropriate because it ignores basic differences between 
judicial and administrative procedures. 
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted, 
emphasis added). While Pilcher might arguably stand for the proposition that an agency that 
adopts the Utah Rules of Evidence may be subject to those rules, it does not "bind" the 
Commission to strictly apply those rules in this or any other case before it. For one thing, the 
Pilcher dictum dealt expressly with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, not the rules of evidence. 
A Commission can identify rules of civil procedure in advance and apply the rules uniformly to all 
cases with little specialized training. By contrast, applications of the rules of evidence would 
require specialized training and significant experience and often need to be decided with little or 
no notice. For a variety of reasons, it is more difficult to restrict a civil service commission, 
whose members are not legally trained, to strict application of the rules of evidence much like a 
court of law. 
The Commission, in its Rules and Regulations, has adopted the Utah Rules of Evidence 
subject to discretionary application by the Commission. 
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At all hearings, the Commission will determine the admissibility of 
evidence and shall use as near as it deems practicable the rules of 
evidence followed in the Courts of this State. 
Rule 13-10 (emphasis added). The express language of the rule permits discretion by the 
Commission in its application of the rules of evidence. Clearly, this does not amount to being 
"bound to abide by the Utah Rules of Evidence" as argued by Officer Lucas. Therefore, any 
failure by the Commission to strictly apply the rules of evidence is not error in and of itself. 
C. Even If The Commission Is Bound By The Rules Of Evidence, Its Exclusion Of The 
Defense Of Retaliatory Discharge Was Appropriate 
Even if the rules of evidence were strictly applicable to the Commission, its exclusion of 
evidence of retaliatory discharge was appropriate. Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly 
provides for the exclusion of irrelevant evidence as inadmissible. As discussed above, the only 
two issues before the Commission were whether Officer Lucas had been untruthful and whether 
his actions justified termination. Any evidence beyond those two inquiries was immaterial to the 
review conducted by the Commission. In other words, the issue before the Commission wasn't 
whether someone was "out to get him" and conducted the investigation in a manner to do so, but 
whether Officer Lucas lied during the internal affairs investigation and at the pre-termination 
hearing. As a result, the Commission properly excluded evidence related to the investigation as 
irrelevant to the inquiry. 
Additionally, on October 14, 1996, the Commission held a motion in limine hearing to 
determine whether the defense of retaliatory discharge should be admitted. The Commission 
actually received evidence, heard oral argument, and determined that the evidence proffered by 
Officer Lucas was immaterial and irrelevant to the Commission's proceedings. (R. 162-163). In 
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a nutshell, the evidence received by the Commission proved that the allegation of retaliatory 
discharge was untenable because neither Chief Killian nor Lieutenant Pete Fondaco knew that 
Officer Lucas was one of the complainants who instigated the 1994 Attorney General's 
investigation. (R. 134-135,136-137, 160-161). The Commission's determination that the 
evidence was irrelevant was based upon motions and memorandum of the parties, on affidavits of 
the material witnesses on the issue, and on argument of counsel at the motion in limine hearing. 
Therefore, the Commission properly determined that any proffered evidence on retaliatory 
discharge was irrelevant and would serve only to convolute the proceedings. 
Officer Lucas argues further that State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438 (Utah 1982) should 
require reversal where the Commission entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law in 
support of its motion in limine. On its face, it is highly questionable whether findings on an 
evidentiary ruling are required of an administrative entity. Of more import to the present case, 
however, is the holding of the Patterson court that, in light of the other evidence presented, the 
failure to enter findings and conclusions was harmless error. Patterson at 439-440. 
D. Even If The Evidence Was Improperly Excluded, Officer Lucas Has Failed To Make 
A Showing Of Harmful Error 
"An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error 
unless the error is harmful." Cal Wadsworth Construction v. City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 
1378 (Utah 1995). To require reversal, the "likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently 
high to undermine confidence in the [outcome]." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 
1996). Reversal of an evidentiary error is necessary only "where, after review of all the evidence 
presented ... it appears that 'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result 
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would have been reached.'" Utah Dept of Transportation v. 6200 South Associates, 872 P.2d 
462, 465 (Utah App. 1994). Otherwise, the error is deemed to be harmless. E.g., Harline at 442. 
Officer Lucas has failed to show and is unable to show that, had the evidence of retaliation 
been admitted, the Commission would have reversed the termination of Officer Lucas. In order to 
make such a showing, Officer Lucas would need to show this Court that the Commission could 
find no facts to support the conclusions reached by Chief Killian that Officer Lucas had been 
untruthful and that termination was warranted. However, Officer Lucas has not made such a 
showing. There is more than enough evidence in the record to support the determinations that 
Officer Lucas was untruthful and that termination was appropriate. To that end, the evidence of 
retaliation was properly excluded. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions entered by the Commission are the best evidence as 
to (1) what the scope of the inquiry was, (2) what the Commission considered, and (3) whether 
the outcome would have been different had the excluded evidence been admitted. Some excerpts 
illustrate these points: 
7. At the hearing, Officer Lucas testified that he did not unholster 
his weapon, but that he unsnapped it twice. 
9. The Commission finds that Officer Lucas' statements regarding 
the holstering and unholstering of his weapon to be inconsistent and 
not credible. Officer Lucas has alternatively testified that he 
thought Spegar may have had sharp objects in his pocket, such as 
drug paraphernalia and/or that he had a weapon in his crotch area. 
The Commission does not find this testimony credible given the 
testimony of Officer Snow that none of the suspects appeared to be 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and that Spegar had been, 
at all times, cooperative during the course of the apprehension and 
interrogation and had made no threatening gestures. Officer Lucas 
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also had ample opportunity to satisfy himself that the suspect did 
not have a weapon. The Commission does not find credible Officer 
Lucas' testimony that he cannot remember whether his weapon was 
holstered or unholstered. Indeed, he testified in great detail about 
his recollection of the weapon and did not indicate during the 
course of his testimony that he could not remember what occurred 
in the interrogation room. Additionally, Officer Lucas testified that 
when he apprehended Spegar at the scene of the crime and was 
concerned that Spegar might have a weapon, he drew down and 
yelled at him words to the effect that he would "blow his brains 
out" if he didn't stop. Thus, it would have been perfectly believable 
had Officer Lucas in the station room believed that Spegar was 
going for a weapon to have done the same thing. Clearly, Officer 
Lucas' statements regarding what occurred in the interrogation 
room and the details of the incident offered by Officer Lucas 
changed substantially in subsequent interviews from the statement 
initially given to Lieutenant Fondaco. Under these circumstances, 
the Commission finds that Chief Killian was reasonable in 
interpreting Officer Lucas' statements as inconsistent and 
untruthful. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions (R. 220-222). 
In the context of the Commission hearing, it is important to know that Officer Lucas' 
statements made to Lt. Fondaco during the investigation and to Chief Killian during the pre-
termination hearing were not simply characterizations by those men. The interview with Lt. 
Fondaco was taped and a transcript prepared. (R. 302-310). Likewise, the pre-termination 
hearing was taped and transcribed. (R. 365-382). In other words, the untruthful statements of 
Officer Lucas were independently verifiable by the Commission. The Commission did not have to 
rely solely upon the testimony of Lt. Fondaco or Chief Killian. Thus, evidence as to retaliatory 
motive was clearly irrelevant to the issue of whether the Commission believed untruthful 
statements had been made. 
Officer Lucas has failed to demonstrate any likelihood that the Commission would have 
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reached a different conclusion had it admitted and considered the evidence of retaliation. The 
Commission's findings and conclusions clearly indicate that it based its decision on the various 
statements made by Officer Lucas and its feeling that his statements were not credible or reliable. 
Had the Commission admitted the evidence of retaliatory motive, there is no indication that the 
outcome would have been different. As a result, any error in excluding that evidence is harmless 
and does not justify reversal. 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO UPHOLD CHIEF 
KILLIAN'S CONCLUSION THAT OFFICER LUCAS HAD BEEN 
UNTRUTHFUL 
The "substantial evidence" standard for judicial review of administrative actions does not 
deal with the quantity of evidence. Rather, "substantial evidence is 'that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 
Harken v. Board of Oil Gas and Minerals, 920 P.2d 1176,1180 (Utah 1996). There is sufficient 
relevant evidence in the record before the Commission to convince a reasonable mind to support 
the Commission's conclusion. 
The key to evaluation of this issue is the materiality of the facts reviewed by the 
Commission and the facts argued by Officer Lucas. At the risk of redundancy, it is important to 
point out that only facts related to the truthfulness of Officer Lucas' various statements are 
material for purposes of determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Officer Lucas' marshaling of 
the evidence (Brief of Petitioner 14-19) includes some facts which are not material to this ultimate 
issue. In addition, much of his statement of evidence which he believes makes the Commission's 
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findings unreasonable is based on the credibility of Mr. Spegar, testimony of Mr. Garcia, who was 
arrested with Mr. Spegar, and other evidence related to the arrest and processing of Mr. Spegar. 
While the circumstances surrounding Officer Lucas' handling of Mr. Spegar may have 
precipitated the internal affairs investigation, those facts and the investigation itself are material to 
the Commission's inquiry only to the extent of what Officer Lucas said during the investigation 
and whether those statements were untruthful. 
The following statements are just some of the material facts that constitute substantial 
evidence upon which the Commission made its determination. Officer Chris Snow came forward 
in a supplemental case report with information indicating that he observed Officer Lucas standing 
at Martin Spegar's side with his service revolver drawn during a search at the Murray City Police 
Department. (R. 300). Upon initial questioning about the event by Lieutenant Fondaco, Officer 
Lucas unequivocally denied ever pulling his weapon from his holster. (R. 306). Officer Lucas 
stated he only "unsnapped" his gun and denied pointing the weapon at Mr. Spegar's head. (R. 
306). Later, Officer Lucas told Vern Peterson during a polygraph interview that his weapon "was 
unsnapped, [his] hand was on it, and it was obviously two or three inches outside the leather. It 
was pointed down...." Officer Lucas then stated several times to Vern Peterson that he "didn't 
know" whether he pulled his weapon or not. (R. 398). Officer Lucas' statements at the pre-
termination hearing were also inconsistent. He stated that "[m]y hand goes for my weapon. I 
unsnap it, and it starts to come out" and that he didn't "know exactly where [his] gun was." (R. 
366). Then Officer Lucas states "I'm leaning forward, pushing this guy away from me, so I'm 
leaning away, and my gun is in and out, sliding up and down. It could have been beside me, it 
could have been pointing at the floor." (R. 367). Officer Lucas goes on to say "my weapon was 
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either in my holster floating in and out as I was pushing the guy away or to the side." (R. 375). 
Looking only at those material facts and others listed in the Commission's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 219- 222) as determinable from reliable sources including taped 
interviews and what Officer Lucas said at the hearing, the Commission concluded that Officer 
Lucas' statements were not credible and that Chief Killian properly deemed them to be untruthful. 
(R. 220-222). There are no material facts which lead to any different conclusion. 
Given the clearly erroneous standard and the great deference given to the Commission's 
findings of fact, this Court should conclude that the Commission acted within its discretion and 
did not abuse that discretion. There is clearly substantial evidence on which the Commission 
could reach its findings. Those findings are not "clearly against the logic and effect" of the 
material facts before the Commission. The factual findings of the Commission should, therefore, 
be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
TERMINATION OF A POLICE OFFICER WAS AN APPROPRIATE 
DISCIPLINARY ACTION FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS 
Department policy requires honesty in general and in internal affairs investigations in 
particular. For example, department policies provide that an officer may be discharged for 
untruthfulness in an internal affairs investigation. Murray City Police Department Policies and 
Procedures § 555(IX)(A) (R. 57). Whether employment termination is an appropriate disciplinary 
action for untruthfulness is determined by the status of the employee. Perhaps termination would 
have been too severe an action for the routine public employee. However, police officers are held 
to a higher standard of conduct than other public employees, especially in matters involving 
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honesty. E.g., In re Discharge of Jones. See also Clearfield City v. Dept. of Employment 
Security, 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) (police officer who committed an illegal act then lied about it 
was properly terminated); Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 446 (Utah App. 
1991) (discharge of prison guard was not excessive where "the position requires high morals, 
control and discipline."); Ackerman v. California State Personnel Board, 193 Cal.Rptr 190, 192 
(1983) (officer's action "would probably warrant some form of punishment less than dismissal if 
he was not a police officer." 
A police officer's dishonesty is of great concern. See Hamilton v. City of Mesa, 916 P.2d 
1136, 1145 (Ariz. App. 1995) (termination of police department employee for untruthfulness was 
not disproportionate). Untruthful statements given by a police officer during an internal 
investigation clearly merit termination. Bell v. Cosgrove, 633 N.Y.S.2d 183 (AD 1995) 
(upholding dismissal of officer for infractions including "knowingly giving false information" 
during internal affairs investigation); Justice v. City ofCasa Grande, 567 P.2d 1195 (Ariz. App. 
1977) (discharge for failing to tell the truth during a departmental investigation). Further, the 
determination that an untruthful officer is not trustworthy to serve as a police officer belongs to 
police personnel and is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Gentry v. City of Helena, 773 P.2d 
309, 315 (Mont. 1989). 
In its conclusions, the Commission demonstrated that it recognized (1) the seriousness of 
termination for untruthfulness and (2) the requirement that the police department be able to rely 
on the basic honesty of its officers. 
4. Trust and honesty are essential to the good order and discipline 
of a police force. 
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5. While discharge, under the circumstances of this case, is a harsh 
punishment, the Police Chief must have complete confidence in the 
honesty and integrity of his officers and the Commission finds that 
it is not an abuse of his discretionary powers to have terminated 
Officer Lucas' employment for reasons of dishonesty. 
(R. 222-23). 
Officer Lucas argues that there was no credible evidence before the Commission that he 
intended to deceive. The focus of inquiry, however, is not whether deceptive intent existed, but 
whether Officer Lucas made, intentionally or unintentionally, untruthful statements or was less 
than candid with his superior officers during the internal affairs investigation and at the pre-
termination hearing. The implications of having a police officer on the force who is unable to 
remember facts and therefore makes unreliable or untruthful statements, both for the police 
department and for the public at large, range from troubling to frightening. It is a fundamental 
requirement in our society that police officials, the courts, and the public are able to believe police 
officers whose testimony may be at odds with those of an arrestee or innocent bystanders. Officer 
Lucas' subjective intent and the issue of whether Officer Lucas intended to deceive his superior 
officers are irrelevant to the inquiries of whether he actually made those inconsistent statements 
and whether his termination therefor was appropriate. 
The requirement for honesty in police officers clearly sets a higher standard for Officer 
Lucas than would be required of a city garbage collector or secretary. The policy of progressive 
discipline may be appropriate in the case of the latter, but because honesty is fundamentally 
expected and required of police officers, it is appropriate to impose a more severe sanction for 
failure to meet the higher standard. 
The Commission properly considered the seriousness of termination and appropriately 
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found it to have been properly invoked under the circumstances of this case. This decision by the 
Commission clearly falls within its "arena of discretion." There is no evidence of abuse of this 
discretion. Therefore, the Court should affirm the Commission decision. 
POINT V 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY EXCLUDED MR. SPEGAR'S TAPED 
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AND EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED, FAILURE TO DO SO WAS 
HARMLESS ERROR 
A. The Commission Properly Excluded The Audio Tape Of Mr. Spegar's Polygraph 
Examination Because Officer Lucas Did Not Lay Proper Foundation 
The requirement to establish foundation for admission of evidence is axiomatic. Rule 901, 
Utah R. Evid. Officer Lucas' counsel attempted to use the tape recording of Mr. Spegar's 
polygraph examination for purposes of impeaching his testimony. As authentication, he wished to 
play a portion of the tape for Mr. Spegar to identify his voice. Upon being denied that 
opportunity, counsel presented no legal argument to support his use of Mr. Spegar's 
authentication as foundation for admitting the evidence. Only now does Mr. Lucas argue that the 
Council's determination not to play the tape improperly precluded his authentication of the 
evidence. This argument should be disregarded because it is raised for the first time on appeal. 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996) (failure to make an argument at 
the administrative proceeding precludes raising it on review); Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service 
Commission 917 P.2d 1082, 1085, n.4 (Utah 1996) (court would not address issue raised for first 
time on appeal). 
It is also significant that the Commission expected that authentication would be made by 
another means. The portion of the transcript which Mr. Lucas omitted from his argument (Brief 
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of Petitioner, p. 31) is directly on point. 
Mr. Ferguson: I think you've got to have the right witness here to 
lay the foundation. 
Mr. Benevento: Can I at least have it subject to recall, then? I think 
I'm done with this witness. 
Mr. Ferguson: Can't Vern Peterson testify that it's him on the tape? 
Mr. Benevento: If he's going to say that that's sufficient 
foundation, that's fine. 
Mr. Ferguson: He's there, he has personal knowledge as to who 
was in the room. 
Mr. Benevento: All right. 
(R. 575). 
Officer Lucas' counsel did not avail himself of the alternative, acceptable means of 
providing foundation for the admission of the tape recording. Nor did he argue why Mr. Spegar 
should be permitted to authenticate the tape. By his actions, he waived any objections to the 
exclusion of this evidence. 
B. Even If The Audio Tape Should Have Been Admitted, The Error Was Harmless 
Even if the tape recording were improperly excluded, Officer Lucas has failed to 
demonstrate that this error was not harmless. First, the transcript of Mr. Spegar's polygraph 
interview was already entered into evidence as Exhibit 21. (R. 420-448). Officer Lucas could 
have impeached Mr. Spegar's testimony with this transcript which had already been introduced 
and needed no additional foundation, but he failed to do so. Second, as with other evidence 
which Officer Lucas wished to present, this evidence was, at best, tangential to the core issue of 
whether Officer Lucas was untruthful in his statements during the investigation and at the pre-
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termination hearing. To that end, the Commission could entirely exclude the testimony of Mr. 
Spegar, with or without impeachment, and still conclude that the claims of untruthfulness were 
supported by the evidence. In fact, a reading of the Commission's findings show that the 
members relied on other evidence to establish their factual findings. 
There is no indication that, had the tape recording been admitted and used to impeach Mr. 
Spegar, the outcome of the hearing would have been different. As a result, any error in failing to 
admit the tape recording was clearly harmless error and does not require judicial reversal. 
POINT VI 
THE COMMISSION APPROPRIATELY RETAINED AND UTILIZED 
THE SERVICES OF INDEPENDENT LEGAL COUNSEL AND EVEN IF 
THE EXTENT OF THE COUNSEL'S INVOLVEMENT WERE 
INAPPROPRIATE, THE ERROR IS HARMLESS 
Officer Lucas' argument that it was beyond the authority of the Commission to retain and 
use the services of independent legal counsel is incongruent with his argument that the 
Commission be bound to apply rules of evidence, which the Commission members are not trained 
or experienced in applying. It is clear that when the Commission deals with rulings on 
admissibility, the scope of its review and issues of law, it needs to have legal advice. The only 
other source of legal advice would be the city attorney or his staff. It is obviously inappropriate 
for the Commission to rely on the legal advice of counsel who are advocating a position before 
the Commission. The need for independent legal advice is apparent and the authority to obtain 
that advice may reasonably be inferred from the statutes and regulations governing the 
Commission. 
Even if the Commission's use of independent legal counsel in this matter were 
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inappropriate, there is still no basis for reversal of the Commission's decision. First, Officer Lucas 
failed to object at the hearing to the involvement of the independent counsel in a way sufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal. Failure to register his objections before the Commission amounted 
to a waiver by Officer Lucas of that issue. See Badger and Harmon supra. Second, the material 
facts were considered and weighed by the Commission members. The Commission made its 
determination mostly from the compiled factual record and in part from testimony at the hearing. 
Officer Lucas has presented no argument or factual basis for the conclusion that the outcome of 
the Commission's inquiry would have been different had the Commission's counsel not taken an 
active part. As with other tangential issues argued by Officer Lucas, any error on the part of the 
Commission with respect to the retention and use of independent legal counsel is harmless error 
which requires no judicial reversal. 
POINT VII 
THE CITY'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS RULES WAS IMMATERIAL TO THE BASIS FOR OFFICER 
LUCAS' TERMINATION AND TO THE COMMISSION'S 
AFFIRMATION OF THAT TERMINATION 
A. The Termination Of Officer Lucas Was Not The Result Of The Internal Affairs 
Investigation 
Once again, it is important to emphasize that Officer Lucas was not terminated for his 
conduct giving rise to the internal affairs investigation. Officer Lucas was terminated for 
untruthfulness, both in the internal affairs investigation and in the pre-termination hearing. His 
termination was not based upon the conclusions derived from the internal affairs investigation of 
his inappropriate conduct during a search of Martin Spegar. As a result, any procedural defects in 
the internal affairs investigation are immaterial to the Commission's determination pursuant to § 
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10-3-1012. 
Officer Lucas argues that he was never notified that the investigation had changed to one 
of dishonesty. (Brief of Petitioner, p. 36). However, the focus of the internal affairs investigation 
never changed from investigating whether or not Officer Lucas' used excessive force during a 
search of Martin Spegar, and the results of that affairs investigation were inconclusive. By 
making the argument that the focus of the investigation changed, Officer Lucas implies that he 
was entitled to some type of internal affairs investigation prior to his dismissal for dishonesty. To 
the contrary, an internal affairs investigation is only required where a complaint has been made 
against an officer, generally by a member of the public. Although the termination was based in 
part upon Officer Lucas' untruthfulness during the internal affairs investigation, his termination 
was not based upon the subject of the investigation. There was never a separate investigation of 
the untruthfulness violation of city policy; nor was one required. Therefore, any failure by the 
City to comply with its internal affairs procedures and policies is immaterial to whether the 
termination of Officer Lucas was appropriate. 
B. There Is No Basis For A Due Process Claim 
Officer Lucas implies that he was deprived of due process, but does not identify the 
process to which he claims entitlement. He did, however, receive due process by way of his pre-
termination hearing. His argument that his termination should be reversed because the city 
allegedly failed to strictly follow its procedure with respect to the original investigation are 
without merit and clearly do not justify reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission properly conducted its inquiry within the parameters defined by statute. 
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It properly excluded issues and evidence which were beyond the scope of its review, immaterial to 
its determinations, and for which no proper foundation had been laid. The Commission also 
properly exercised its discretion in determining that there was sufficient evidence and justification 
for upholding Chief Killian's termination of Officer Lucas. 
Given the narrow nature of the statutorily prescribed judicial review and the great 
deference afforded to the Commission while acting within its discretion, this Court should affirm 
the determination of the Commission. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1997. 
By_ LXuZ^ 
-H. Craig Hall 
Murray City Attorney 
5025 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84157-0520 
(801) 264-2640 
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